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TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN EPISTEMIC AND
MORAL VALUES IN EVIDENCE-BASED
POLICY
DONAL KHOSROWI∗
Abstract: Proponents of evidence-based policy (EBP) call for public policy
to be informed by high-quality evidence from randomized controlled
trials. This methodological preference aims to promote several epistemic
values, e.g. rigour, unbiasedness, precision, and the ability to obtain causal
conclusions. I argue that there is a trade-off between these epistemic
values and several non-epistemic, moral and political values. This is
because the evidence afforded by standard EBP methods is differentially
useful for pursuing different moral and political values. I expand on how
this challenges ideals of value-freedom and -neutrality in EBP, and offer
suggestions for how EBP methodology might be revised.
Keywords: evidence-based policy, values, trade-off, value-freedom, value-
neutrality
1. INTRODUCTION
Evidence-based policy (EBP) is the movement according to which
public policy should be informed by high-quality empirical evidence for
policy effectiveness from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and meta-
analyses. EBP advocates’ emphasis on the superior epistemic credentials
of these methods can be understood to derive from several epistemic
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values such as methodological rigour, unbiasedness, precision, and the
ability to obtain causal conclusions about policy effectiveness.
In what follows I argue that these epistemic values stand in a
trade-off relation with a wide range of moral values underlying the
policy goals that policymakers may be interested in achieving with
the help of effectiveness evidence. Specifically, I argue that standard
EBP methodological recommendations, and the evidence produced in
accordance with them, can severely inhibit policymakers’ ability to
pursue moral values such as equality or priority for the worst-off on
the basis of typical EBP research outputs. This is because standard
EBP methods are not informative about the distributive consequences of
policies (see e.g. Manski 2000; Deaton 2010 for similar concerns). This is
a substantive shortcoming, particularly when there are reasons to suspect
that a policy intervention may make some individuals worse off. Since
the evidence typically afforded by EBP methods is uninformative about
such distributive consequences, it is differentially useful for the pursuit
of different moral and political values, specifically values that do or do
not put emphasis on how benefits and harms induced by policies are
distributed among individuals. I argue that this differential usefulness
gives rise to a trade-off between epistemic and non-epistemic moral
values, where, relative to current EPB methodological tenets, advances
to produce more informative evidence on distributive effects come at the
expense of sacrificing several key EBP epistemic values at once. I elaborate
how this may challenge both value-freedom and neutrality in EBP.
The contents are organized as follows. In Section 2 I reconstruct some
of the key epistemic values involved in EBP as well as whether and how
EBP involves ideals of value-freedom and neutrality. In Section 3 I expand
on the epistemic challenges that EBP methodology faces with respect
to generating information about the distributive consequences of policy
interventions. In Section 4 I offer my argument for the trade-off between
central EBP epistemic values and moral values that are sensitive to
distributive consequences of policies. I also expand on the consequences
for value-freedom and neutrality in EBP and elaborate how an epistemic-
ethical approach might be a promising way of facilitating deliberation
about how this situation should be addressed. Section 5 concludes.
2. VALUES IN EBP
To build a basis for developing my subsequent arguments, let me begin
with two short reconstructions. The first concerns the central epistemic
values that I take to be underlying EBP methodology. The second concerns
what I consider to be the roles of value-freedom and -neutrality in EBP
respectively.
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2.1. Epistemic Values in EBP
It is important to note that there is perhaps no universally accepted set
of epistemic values common to all activities under the EBP heading.
More fundamentally, it may be contested whether there is something
like a unified EBP paradigm at all. The EBP movement, particularly as
it changes over time and in response to various criticisms, is difficult to
precisely demarcate as a unified paradigm with distinctive and invariant
objectives, methods, underlying epistemic value presuppositions and so
forth.1 Moreover, it is also difficult to find clear-cut commitments to
particular sets of epistemic values, which means that the reconstruction
I offer below will be just that: a reconstruction that is potentially imperfect
and incomplete in its rendition of the actual roles of epistemic values in
EBP.
That being said, it seems uncontroversial that there is a kernel of
epistemic values that are common to a broad variety of activities under
the EBP heading. This is because many of these activities are conducted
in accordance with standard methodological recommendations offered by
key institutions, such as the Campbell Collaboration, the What Works
Clearinghouse, CONSORT, GRADE, the Cochrane Collaboration, JPAL
and others. Many of these methodological recommendations, in particular
so-called quality-of-evidence ranking schemes that rank different kinds of
evidence according to quality and credibility, overlap in their emphasis
on a kernel of epistemic values. These values are not coextensive with
traditional epistemic values in the context of theory choice or appraisal
such as those offered by Kuhn (1977). Instead, for empirical paradigms
such as EBP the core epistemic values of interest concern the estimation of
policy effects and include the methodological rigour that should be exercised
when using different methods to obtain such estimates; the unbiasedness
and precision of these estimates; and the ability to obtain causal conclusions
about policy interventions on grounds of such estimates.
More specifically, methodological rigour is broadly understood as
an attitude towards focusing on the use of only those methods that
are believed to be (most) reliable in producing correct estimates of
the quantities one is interested in measuring; the thorough exercise of
appropriate precautions to ensure and demonstrate that the assumptions
1 In addition to this caveat, it is important to note that the construal of Evidence-Based
Policy I consider here is somewhat narrow in that it focuses on the so-called treatment
effects literature as instantiated in e.g. development economics and educational research.
The distinctive characteristic of this literature is its predominant focus on experimental and
quasi-experimental methods to estimate treatment effects. This is considerably narrower
than a construal of evidence-based policy as policy that is informed by any empirical
evidence rather than only specific kinds of such evidence. I thank Erin Nash for calling
for clarification.
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required for the successful use of these methods are valid; as well as a
clear preference for methods that require few substantive assumptions to
begin with.
Unbiasedness is typically understood in the sense that the effects
estimated by using certain methods should identify only the quantities
that one is interested in measuring, e.g. the causal effect of an intervention
on X on an outcome Y, rather than, for instance, also capturing the effects
of other variables on Y.
Precision is the requirement that studies should be adequately
powered to detect the effects of interest, e.g. by ensuring that sample sizes
are sufficiently large and that error bounds on the estimates of interest
(although not always computable without substantive assumptions, see
e.g. Deaton 2010) are sufficiently small to minimize uncertainties about
the magnitudes and signs of the effects being estimated.
Finally, the ability to obtain causal conclusions about policy effectiveness
is the central idea that EBP research should focus on the production
of quantities that are actionable for the purposes of policymakers, i.e.
quantities, which, if correctly estimated, can figure as a basis for designing
successful policy interventions. For that, the estimated effects must be
successfully causally attributed to the intervention variables of interest, as
otherwise subsequent intervention on such variables may fail to produce
the expected or desired effects.
The above values seem central to EBP in the sense that they seem
to underpin many aspects of standard EBP methodology, i.e. a set of
salient methodological principles that are shared among proponents of the
paradigm and are widely circulated in methodological recommendations,
guidelines and manuals that advise practitioners on how to conduct and
evaluate studies on policy effectiveness. For instance, EBP methodological
recommendations specifically focus on certain epistemic targets, i.e.
causal conclusions about policy effectiveness that are informative for
policy formation. Moreover, EBP methodology is premised on principles
concerning the relative desirability of certain kinds of evidence, e.g. by
using quality-of-evidence ranking schemes to express a strict preference
for experimental and quasi-experimental over purely observational
evidence. Finally, EBP methodology emphasizes the relative ability of
different methods with respect to generating desirable kinds of evidence;
again by focusing on RCTs and quasi-experimental designs as opposed
to observational studies. Together, these methodological tenets mediate
between epistemic values and method choice in the sense that EBP
methodological recommendations, such as those issued by quality-of-
evidence ranking schemes, seem to advocate the use of certain methods,
notably RCTs, specifically because these methods are considered to best
promote the achievement of crucial epistemic values such as those
outlined above.
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With this brief reconstruction of key EBP epistemic values in place, let
me turn to reconstruct the role of value-freedom and -neutrality ideals in
EBP.
2.2. Value-Freedom and -Neutrality in EBP
It is not obvious that EBP proponents in general pursue any specific
ideal with respect to value-freedom and -neutrality, i.e. concerning
whether non-epistemic, moral values may play a role in the conduct
of EBP research, and whether the outputs of this research may involve
substantive moral value presuppositions. This is particularly difficult to
tell as EBP methodological guidelines rarely comment on value-related
issues.
Despite the difficulties involved in finding explicit commitments to
ideals of value-freedom and -neutrality, it seems plausible to think that
the EBP movement rests on a relatively broad axiological presupposition
that some division of labour with regard to settling normative issues of
what values public policy should promote, and settling factual issues
of what are effective interventions to promote these values, is possible.
In other words, while it is clear that evidence-based policy invariably
involves moral and political values when it comes to specifying what
outcomes policies should promote, EBP seems to rest on the assumption
that agreement on the desirability of policy outcomes can be separated from
the production of evidence speaking for the effectiveness of interventions
in realizing these outcomes. On this view, whether or not a policy
intervention such as reducing class sizes is effective in increasing student
performance is an issue that can (and should) be settled independently of
whether it is in fact desirable to increase student performance. The latter
is supposed to be a question of values, the former a question of empirical
facts pertaining to ‘what works’; and it is the focus on documenting ‘what
works’ that EBP is expressly committed to.
This broadly parallels traditional ideals regarding the role of non-
epistemic, moral values in economics, where economists have frequently
invoked the metaphor of economists as social engineers, who provide
factual answers to policy questions independently from and typically after
policymakers have settled issues concerning the relative desirability
of social outcomes (cf. Hausman and McPherson 1996). While EBP
proponents may not subscribe to this particular ideal, EBP methodology
seems to presuppose at least that some such division of labour is possible
in the sense that one can empirically investigate the effectiveness of
policy interventions largely independently from questions concerning the
desirability of the outcomes that they bring about (see Vedung 2010 for a
similar reconstruction). Let me expand on what this suggests for the role
of value-freedom and -neutrality in EBP.
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First, it seems that EBP involves some ideal of value-freedom in the
sense that non-epistemic values are generally not and should not be
involved in shaping the conduct and outcomes of EBP research internally.
According to such an ideal, while non-epistemic values may be involved
in selecting the kinds of policy issues and interventions being studied,
the outcome variables of interest, and may act as constraints on whether
conducting RCTs is morally permissible, non-epistemic, moral values are
generally not and should not be involved in the choice and application of
methods once these issues are settled (see Biddle 2013: 124 for a related
sketch of such a demarcation). For instance, the choice between RCTs
and observational studies, the collection of data for such studies, or the
interpretation of estimates obtained from such studies, should not vary
with respect to researchers’ (or policymakers’) convictions concerning the
desirability of the policies under scrutiny. These internal aspects should be
guided by epistemic values alone.
Second, EBP seems to involve some version of value-neutrality in the
sense that the outcomes of EBP research are intended to be value-neutral
insofar as they should not, and generally do not, issue unconditional
normative claims regarding the desirability of social outcomes. At most, if
there are normative claims issued in the dissemination of EBP research,
these claims take the shape of hypothetical imperatives, i.e. normative
claims that are conditional on some substantive value presupposition
but do not endorse this value presupposition as such. In order for EBP
research to maintain value-neutrality, the adequacy of presuppositions
speaking for the desirability of some social outcome must be settled
independently from (and perhaps prior to) generating information about
the effectiveness of different interventions in producing the outcome. If
such independence is achieved, then even if EBP research sometimes issues
normative claims, e.g. when researchers suggest that some intervention is
preferable to others because it is more (cost-) effective, these claims would
still be value-neutral since they remain non-committal on the adequacy
of the substantive moral value presuppositions involved, i.e. whether the
outcomes of interest are in fact morally desirable. These issues are left to
policymakers and otherwise suitably legitimized agents to settle.
With this brief reconstruction of the central epistemic values in EBP as
well as the role of value-freedom and -neutrality in place, let me focus on
the main issue that I am interested in, which is that standard EBP methods
are differentially suitable for the pursuit of different kinds of moral
and political values, specifically values that do or do not put emphasis
on the distributive consequences of policies. This differential usefulness
creates a trade-off relation between epistemic and moral values in EBP. To
explain why this is so, let me begin by offering some background on the
epistemic challenges involved in producing evidence on the distributive
consequences of policy interventions.
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3. TREATMENT EFFECT HETEROGENEITY
Public policy interventions almost invariably affect agents in heteroge-
neous ways. Consider for instance the case of microfinance programmes,
i.e. programmes that supply microcredit to agents who lack access to
capital markets. Let us grant for the moment that at least some of these
programmes may be successful in generating some kinds of positive long-
term consequences, e.g. by increasing average household endowment or
private investment in durable goods. Even so, behavioural response to
microfinance access often differs significantly between agents (see e.g.
Banerjee et al. 2017). Some agents, e.g. those whose otherwise successful
entrepreneurial efforts are inhibited by inadequate access to capital
markets, may significantly benefit from such programmes. Yet, other,
economically less sophisticated agents may be driven into debt traps by
pursuing unprofitable business plans and taking up high-interest loans in
order to repay initial programme loans.
Such heterogeneity in individual treatment effects is attributable to
differences in the causal mechanisms involved in the production of the
outcomes of interest or the individual-specific realizations of variables
that figure in these mechanisms. Specifically, the causal mechanisms
connecting treatment and outcome variables typically involve what I will
call interactive covariates of the treatment effect, i.e. variables that causally
interact with the treatment and can modify the magnitude and/or sign of
the causal effect induced by one and the same intervention.2 For instance,
the mechanisms that causally relate microfinance access and eventual
welfare outcomes of agents plausibly involve an extensive battery of
interactive covariates such as entrepreneurial ability, education, prior
business ownership, pre-intervention budget constraints, business plan
feasibility etc. As individuals will typically differ in their individual-
specific realizations of these factors, as well as whether and how they
are involved in the individual-specific mechanisms that govern the
production of the outcomes of interest, individual treatment effects with
respect to one and the same intervention will typically differ between
individuals.
This kind of heterogeneity is likely to obtain in many areas
traditionally targeted by EBP, e.g. in educational policy, where students
may respond differentially to educational initiatives as a function of
initial ability; in economic policy where behavioural response to policy
interventions may differ significantly between industries, firms and other
units of agency; and in public health and development economics,
where agents’ response to interventions such as distributing free
2 Standard instances of such variables are so-called treatment effect moderators as well as
some kinds of mediating variables.
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insecticide-treated bed nets might exhibit substantial heterogeneity as a
function of agents’ basic needs or epidemiological knowledge.
As these stylized facts indicate, heterogeneity among agents’ response
to treatment is ubiquitous in several key areas targeted by EBP. Yet,
the issue of heterogeneity has only recently attracted attention from
EBP proponents (in contrast to evidence-based medicine, see e.g. Oxman
and Guyatt 1992 for an early treatment). This is surprising because
heterogeneity is also responsible for one of the most basic inferential
challenges that EBP faces, i.e. the problem of extrapolating experimental
results from study populations to eventual policy targets. Let me expand
on some technical background to explain why this is the case.
3.1. Heterogeneity Information from RCTs
More formally, treatment effect heterogeneity is the systematic variation
in the sign and/or magnitude of individual treatment effects among
agents who are subject to a given intervention. In a potential outcomes
framework (Rubin 1974; Holland 1986), given an outcome of interest Y,
the individual treatment effect (ITE) for individual i is the difference
between her potential outcome Yi (1) given the treatment and her potential
outcome Yi (0) in the absence of treatment, other things being equal. Since
only one of the two values of Yi can ever be observed, ITEs are in principle
unobservable magnitudes (Rubin 1974).
RCTs offer a partial remedy for this inferential dead-end by permitting
the estimation of average treatment effects (ATEs) instead of ITEs. This
is achieved through balancing the net effects of confounding factors
as well as interactive covariates by means of random assignment of
subjects to experimental and control conditions, and multiple blinding
of trial participants, those administering treatment and those recording
and interpreting outcomes. Provided that randomization (and blinding
etc.) are successful in that the net effects of confounders and interactive
covariates (including interactions among them) are approximately
balanced between treatment and control groups, an ideal RCT can help
obtain, in expectation, an unbiased estimate of the ATE by taking the
difference in means of Y for treated and untreated units, or̂ATE = Yt(1) −
Yc(0).
This estimate of the sample ATE, however, does not permit inferences
about ITEs. At best, and in the absence of any knowledge about interactive
covariates as well as heterogeneity in their individual-specific realizations,
the ATE estimate can figure as the expectation of the ITE for an individual
randomly drawn from the experimental population. But as soon as
there is variation between individuals in their realizations of interactive
covariates, and consequently variation in ITEs, inferences about ITEs are
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largely precluded and information on heterogeneity cannot be recovered
from̂ATE .
This has significant bearing on the transferability of trial results, i.e.
the extent to which the ATE from an experimental population A can
be expected to be replicated in some other population B. Two jointly
sufficient conditions for the transferability of trial results (in the particular
sense adopted here) to some out-of-sample target are first, that the
treatment variable plays the same causal role in the production of the
outcome in the target as it does in the experimental population, i.e.
that the mechanisms in both populations are sufficiently similar with
respect to the causal effect to be extrapolated. The second condition is
that the distribution of interactive covariates of the treatment effect is
the same in both populations (see e.g. Cartwright and Marcellesi 2015
for such conditions).3 So the transferability of experimental results to
targets hinges not only on sufficient similarity in mechanisms between
populations but also on whether there is heterogeneity induced by
differences in interactive covariates as well as how these variables are
distributed among agents in the populations of interest. This problem
has received attention from a variety of econometricians, methodologists,
philosophers of science and EBP proponents (e.g. Hotz et al. 2005; Duflo
et al. 2008; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009; Bareinboim and Pearl 2013;
Cartwright and Marcellesi 2015).
Treatment effect heterogeneity does not only affect the transferability
of trial results. It also creates a second challenge for EBP. The challenge is
that in the absence of information on heterogeneity, RCTs are not suitable
for informing policy formation processes that are concerned with the
distributive consequences of policy (see e.g. Manski 2000). More specifically,
policymakers may often be interested in knowing not only whether
an intervention is effective on average but also in how effective the
intervention will be for specific types of agents, how treatment effects are
distributed among agents, with respect to which observable pre-treatment
characteristics they exhibit heterogeneity, whether heterogeneity obtains
in magnitude or also in sign, etc.
Such information is crucial particularly when it is reasonable to
suspect that agents may be harmed by an intervention, even though the
ATE might be positive. In these scenarios, several pertinent distributive
concerns arise, e.g. is it at all permissible to implement a policy that
will render some agents worse off? If so, how should we adjudicate
between the negative welfare consequences for these agents and the
net effectiveness of the intervention? What are the thresholds of
proportionality that we should use to decide whether benefits on the part
3 Necessary conditions might be weaker, see Bareinboim and Pearl (2013).
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of some outweigh losses on the part of others? Can the policy be targeted
so that it predominantly affects those who will most likely benefit from
the intervention? And so forth.
As these considerations suggest, policymakers may be interested in
pursuing a variety of different distributive values. Yet, in order to pursue
these values effectively, in the sense that the available evidence gives them
good reasons to believe that an intervention will in fact promote them,
policymakers require information on treatment effect heterogeneity, i.e.
whether there is heterogeneity at all and how heterogeneous treatment
effects are distributed with respect to agents’ observable characteristics.
As I have argued above, RCTs cannot provide such information on their
own.
This does not mean that EBP methodology is at a complete loss in
this regard, however, as one way to address this problem is to perform
so-called subgroup analyses. While this is feasible as long as researchers
have obtained pre-treatment data on potential interactive covariates of
the treatment effect, I argue below that performing such analyses, when
judged against the background of standard quality-of-evidence ranking
schemes circulated in EBP, comes at the expense of sacrificing several key
EBP epistemic values. This creates a tradeoff between several epistemic
values central to EBP and the pursuit of moral and political values such as
equality and priority for the worst-off.
3.2. Subgroup Analysis as a Remedy for Informing about Heterogeneity
Following Duflo et al. (2008), subgroup analyses partition experimental
populations into subgroups according to observable pre-treatment
characteristics such as age, sex, ethnicity, prior education etc. They
then typically further partition subgroups into different categories or
strata, for instance age groups. Given this stratification, a difference-
in-means estimation can be performed on the partitioned data to
obtain conditional, subgroup-specific ATEs (CATEs); this helps us tell
whether treatment effects differ between subgroups. A somewhat more
sophisticated alternative to this are regression-based approaches, where
potentially interesting interactive covariates of the treatment effect are
modelled as interaction terms with the treatment indicator in a standard
regression framework. In doing so, it is possible to obtain information on
the significance of interaction effects between observable variables and
the treatment indicator, which may be taken to suggest that the variables
in question induce heterogeneity in the treatment effect of interest.
Even so, while subgroup analyses provide at least tentative
information about heterogeneity, they are also subject to several pertinent
methodological concerns. Let me expand on two particularly pressing
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concerns and explain how they bear on the achievement of EBP epistemic
values.
First, the information that CATE- and regression-based approaches
can generate is purely correlational in nature, and hence subject to
standard concerns about endogeneity and consequent bias. For instance,
consider the case where we estimate a significant positive interaction
between microfinance access and prior business ownership, suggesting
that agents who previously owned a business will benefit more from
microfinance access. Such a finding does not permit the straightforward
conclusion that prior business ownership is a causally relevant interactive
covariate of the treatment effect. This is because the significance
of the estimate may be attributable to common-causes, e.g. because
business ownership is strongly correlated with business education,
and it is business education that is causally relevant for inducing
different behavioural responses to microfinance access, but prior business
ownership in the absence of (or conditional on) business education may
not contribute at all to microfinance treatment effects.4 In this case, if
business education is not included in the regression, our estimates of
individual-level heterogeneity with respect to prior business ownership
will be upwards biased.
Randomization at the treatment stage does not alleviate this problem
because although it ensures, in expectation, that the net effects of
prior business ownership and business education on the outcome are
distributed equally between treated and untreated units, it leaves the
covariance between the two variables untouched. So if we run a regression
with an interaction term including only prior business ownership and
find that there is a significant interaction with the treatment indicator, this
result can be misleading. This is because the variable that truly induces the
subgroup differences, business education, will be captured by the error
term, and since it is still correlated with prior business ownership, this
yields a biased estimate of the interaction between treatment and prior
business ownership.
More generally, parameter estimates for interactive treatment effect
covariates will invariably remain subject to such concerns unless
researchers are prepared to entertain the relatively strong assumption that
4 For instance, prior business ownership in the absence of business education can be
exhibited by agents who have previously pursued unprofitable business plans and may
continue to do so in the future. Thus the unbiased parameter estimate for business
ownership is likely to be substantially smaller than the estimate for business education.
To permit unbiased estimation of interaction terms, one would at least need to induce
additional exogenous variation in the covariates of interest. But this would require
significantly different trials designs with multiple, parallel interventions on treatment as
well as interactive covariates (see e.g. Imai et al. 2013). While such designs are in principle
feasible, they also raise issues with precision and statistical power.
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the subgroup variables of interest are uncorrelated with the error term
of the regression (cf. Pearl 2014), i.e. there may be no common causes
of the putative subgroup variable of interest and the outcome that are
captured by the error term and that could induce the apparent interaction
of the subgroup variable with the treatment indicator. However, it
is precisely such questionable identification assumptions, which are
necessary for unbiased identification in any standard regression context,
that EBP proponents are keen to avoid. Indeed, randomization is expressly
emphasized in the methodological literature as the key strategy to help
avoid making such assumptions.
This means that using subgroup analyses to obtain unbiased estimates
of heterogeneous treatment effects and straightforward causal conclusions
about the role of interactive covariates that induce them is typically
precluded, threatening at least two EBP epistemic values at once.
A second worry about subgroup analyses is with regard to the
precision of effect estimates, including concerns about statistical power. In
short, the more subgroups one specifies, the higher the probability of
obtaining spurious results. For typical significance levels at P < 0.05 even
a moderate number of subgroups, strata partitions and corresponding
hypothesis tests will render the occurrence of spurious results exceedingly
likely. At the very least, suitable statistical corrections are in order
to remedy the consequences of multiple testing for the prevalence of
false positives. Yet, while recommended by some EBP proponents (e.g.
Duflo et al. 2008: 65), this is rarely carried out in practice (Fink et al.
2014: 47). In short, these concerns about hypothesis testing pose a
threat to the envisioned methodological rigour mandated in standard EBP
methodological guidelines.
Moreover, to alleviate concerns about insufficient statistical power,
sample sizes may need to be expanded for subgroup analyses to be
informative at all. For instance, in order to detect a heterogeneity
signal of the same magnitude as the sample ATE and with the same
precision as the sample ATE estimate, a difference-in-means estimation
on just one subgroup partitioned into two strata requires a fourfold
expansion of the original sample size (Varadhan and Seeger 2013: 38).
Yet, subgroup-specific effects may be smaller than ATEs, particularly
in relatively homogeneous trial populations.5 So adequately powered
subgroup analyses may frequently require much greater expansions
of sample sizes to permit detection of heterogeneous effects. In short,
this suggests that the epistemic value of precision is threatened for the
investigation of subgroup-specific effects.
5 This does not mean that heterogeneity in eventual target populations, as well as
heterogeneity between experimental and target populations is similarly mild, however,
so it is still important to learn about heterogeneous effects.
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These and other, related concerns limit the extent to which subgroup
analyses can inform about treatment effect heterogeneity in a way that
lives up to the epistemic standards imposed by EBP methodological
guidelines. Standard methodological recommendations (e.g. Varadhan
and Seeger 2013) suggest that subgroup findings should at most be
considered exploratory in the sense that they may prompt additional
investigations such as novel trials on subgroups of interest, but are
insufficient to warrant definitive conclusions about heterogeneity by
themselves. However, while conducting novel RCTs on subgroups
appears to be a viable strategy for addressing some of the above concerns,
this requires prior identification of the relevant subgroups. Unfortunately,
we are rarely in the epistemically fortunate position to know which
individuals are most likely to incur welfare losses in advance, since that
depends on knowing what the causally relevant interactive covariates
of the treatment effect are, how they affect the outcomes of interest
as well as which agents exhibit beneficial or harmful realizations of
these variables. So information on heterogeneity, possibly obtained from
subgroup analyses, is still required even if we are willing to conduct
subsequent RCTs on particular subgroups to obtain unbiased estimates
of subgroup-specific effects.
The extant EBP literature has only recently started to address
treatment effect heterogeneity issues. Yet, even though there are several
recent social policy and development studies that perform at least
tentative and exploratory heterogeneity analyses, they frequently fail to
address one or more of the concerns outlined above (see e.g. Fink et al.
2014) or tend to focus on heterogeneity that obtains between estimates
obtained in different trials, which is a related but conceptually distinct issue
from the within-trial and between-subject heterogeneity that I consider here.
Specifically, between-trial heterogeneity may not only occur as a result
of individual-level differences in treatment effects, but also as a result
of trial-specific differences such as differences in the interventions being
tested or the quality of treatment implementation, as well as differences
in the methods used to estimate their effects. Investigations of such
between-trial heterogeneity are mostly focused on determining whether
heterogeneity is random or systematic, attributing heterogeneity to
differences between trials, and deciding whether trial results, despite such
differences, may still be aggregated in systematic reviews of effectiveness
evidence. Such studies are hence not typically concerned with exploring
individual-level heterogeneity in treatment effects and even less so with
the distribution of treatment effects within populations.
Let me expand on how these epistemic challenges for informing about
heterogeneity create a trade-off between epistemic and moral values in
EBP and how this trade-off challenges both value-freedom and neutrality
in EBP.
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4. A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN EPISTEMIC AND NON-EPISTEMIC VALUES
The trade-off between epistemic and non-epistemic values that I want to
highlight is a result of the differential usefulness of EBP research outcomes
for the pursuit of different kinds of moral values, i.e. values that do or do
not take into consideration the distribution of harms and benefits induced
by policy interventions.
Standard EBP methods such as RCTs are in general capable of
estimating ATEs.6 These quantities are sufficient for the pursuit of
values that are concerned with increasing or maximizing aggregate or
average welfare, such as the kinds of broadly utilitarian values pursued
by policymakers who focus on the net (cost-) effectiveness of policy
interventions. Standard EBP evidence is suitable for the pursuit of such
values because the distribution of individual-specific contributions to
aggregate effects is not a primary concern when aiming to increase
aggregate or average welfare, so information on heterogeneity is not
necessary for the pursuit of these values.7
However, information on heterogeneity is necessary for the pursuit of
any moral and political value that is sensitive to how aggregate outcomes
are realized. For instance, the pursuit of broadly egalitarian or prioritarian
values requires at least information on the pre-intervention distribution
of the outcome variable among agents as well as information on the
changes to this distribution brought about by the intervention at issue.8
Similarly, pursuing a strict paretian welfare criterion, a precautionary
principle, or any other value that places particular emphasis on not
harming agents, will require one to obtain information on whether any
agents are made worse off by some intervention. As I have argued above,
such information cannot be provided by RCTs alone. At the very least,
subgroup analyses need to be carried out in order to permit at least
tentative conclusions about heterogeneity. Unfortunately, standard EBP
methodological recommendations tend to explicitly discourage subgroup
analyses.
For instance, JPAL, one of the leading institutions in development
programme evaluation, cautions against the use of subgroup analyses.
In the methodology section on their website, JPAL warns specifically
6 This extends to quasi-experimental approaches such as matching, instrumental variables
and regression discontinuity identification strategies as well. While some of these
approaches can only (without strong assumptions) identify local average treatment effects
(LATEs), the concerns outlined here apply to these approaches as well since the causal
quantities at issue are still average quantities.
7 It might still be helpful, since welfare maximization may be easier to accomplish when we
have information that helps pick out those individuals who will likely benefit most from
some intervention.
8 See Atkinson (2011) for similar concerns about the limited ability of representative agent
models to inform about distributive consequences of interventions.
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about the occurrence of spurious results, i.e. that when testing multiple
subgroup hypotheses ‘it is likely that the [subgroup] difference[s] [are]
due simply to random chance – not our program’ (JPAL 2017). While it is
important to emphasize the problems associated with multiple hypothesis
testing, JPAL’s methodology section does not offer advice for how to
correct for multiple testing, which statistical methods for estimating
heterogeneous treatment effects are preferable, or how the credibility
of subgroup analyses should be assessed when relevant precautions
are taken. Absent such guidance, this suggests that ATEs constitute
distinctively superior evidence for policy design purposes.
In a similar vein, the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) Procedures
and Standards Handbook (v.3.0) for conducting systematic reviews
expresses a clear preference for aggregate quantities, i.e. ATEs, over
subgroup-specific results:
When a study presents findings separately for several groups . . . without
presenting an aggregate result, the WWC will query authors to see if they
conducted an analysis on the full sample ... . If the WWC is unable to obtain
aggregate results from the author, the WWC averages across subgroups
within a study to use as the primary finding and presents the subgroup
results as supplemental tables. (What Works Clearinghouse 2014: 17)
Moreover, for expedited reviews, the WWC exercises ‘discretion
to focus each study review on eligible findings only from the full
sample (rather than on subgroups)’ (What Works Clearinghouse 2017: 18),
suggesting that a trade-off between the expediency of a systematic review
and the informativeness of the results about the distribution of treatment
effects is settled in favour of expediency.9
Finally, the WWC does not consider subgroup analysis evidence
relevant for overall assessments of programme effects. Specifically,
‘[f]or WWC intervention reports, the average measure factors into
the intervention rating, but the separate subgroup results do not’
(What Works Clearinghouse 2014: 28), meaning that overall assessments
of comparative effectiveness of interventions simply disregard the
distributive consequences of these interventions.
Similarly, according to the CONSORT 2010 statement, subgroup
analyses are ancillary analyses, which means that they are not considered
to be part of the main results of an effectiveness analysis; thus again
placing recognizably more emphasis on ATE results. In a more general
assessment, CONSORT also cautions that
because of the high risk for spurious findings, subgroup analyses are often
discouraged. Post hoc subgroup comparisons (analyses done after looking
9 See Elliott and McKaughan (2014) for a related case on the relationship between epistemic
values and non-epistemic values such as expediency.
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at the data) are especially likely not to be confirmed by further studies. Such
analyses do not have great credibility. (Moher et al. 2010: 14)
Another pertinent example comes from the Cochrane Collaboration
Handbook,10 which cautions that subgroup analyses may be misleading
since they are observational in nature and ‘suffer the same limitations
of any observational investigation, including possible bias through
confounding’ (Higgins and Green 2011: ch. 9.6.6). This makes clear that
subgroup analyses are generally considered as being of the same quality
and credibility as observational studies, which typically rank lower in
quality-of-evidence rankings than the ATEs reported in the same studies
that such subgroup analyses may be part of. Again, the trade-off between
informativeness regarding distributive consequences of interventions and
the potential bias involved in subgroup analyses that could produce such
information is settled in favour of unbiasedness.
Another important set of recommendations comes from the GRADE
guidelines for systematic reviews, which consider treatment effect
heterogeneity and subgroup analysis under the general heading of
factors that reduce the quality of evidence. GRADE considers treatment
effect heterogeneity under the label of inconsistency, where evidence
is considered inconsistent if multiple studies on the same or similar
interventions produce different point estimates of treatment effects, thus
indicating potential heterogeneity in treatment effects.
There are two notable recommendations in the GRADE guidelines.
The first is that authors of systematic reviews should ‘combine results [in a
systematic review] only if . . . it is plausible that the underlying magnitude
of treatment effect is similar’ (Guyatt et al. 2011: 1295). So different point
estimates of treatment effects should only be combined if there is little
or no heterogeneity in the treatment effects across studies. This makes it
unlikely that systematic reviews will be able to provide comprehensive
accounts of heterogeneous treatment effects since heterogeneity itself is
taken as reason not to consider the evidence-base as amenable to a single
systematic review.
Moreover, according to GRADE, heterogeneity in treatment effects,
if unexplained, should be taken as reason to discount the quality of
a body of evidence (Guyatt et al. 2011: 1295). While GRADE suggests
that authors should try to explain apparent heterogeneity by means of
subgroup analyses, GRADE also maintains that ’ most putative subgroup
effects ultimately prove spurious’ (Guyatt et al. 2011: 1297).
10 While the Cochrane Collaboration focuses on evidence-based medicine, it is still widely
considered to provide useful guidelines for effectiveness evaluation of interventions more
generally. For instance, the Campbell Collaboration guidelines, which focus on Evidence-
Based Policy, make extensive references to the recommendations offered in the Cochrane
Handbook.
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This seems odd. Surely, there can be cases where apparent
heterogeneity is spurious or arises due to errors, including cases where
it is difficult to tell that this is so. In these cases it would seem sensible
to discount the quality of a body of evidence. At the same time, there
will also arguably be many cases where there is genuine heterogeneity
in the effect of interest, including cases where important heterogeneity
might remain unexplained, despite our best efforts to explain it. What
is striking here is that, at least in these latter cases, the GRADE
recommendations would imply that the very nature of the phenomenon
under scrutiny should be taken as a reason to discount the quality of the
evidence pertaining to the phenomenon. It hence seems that the GRADE
recommendations are only sensible if one believes that unexplained
heterogeneity is significantly more likely to be spurious or a result of
error, rather than genuine but unexplained despite our best efforts. It
remains unclear, however, what the argument for this presupposition is,
as well as what underlying standard GRADE envisions when it comes
to classifying heterogeneity as unexplained. In the absence of further
clarifications on these issues, it seems that the GRADE recommendations
establish a clear, but unsubstantiated preference to discount evidence
indicating potentially important heterogeneity, as well as the subgroup
evidence that could help elucidate such heterogeneity.
The above methodological recommendations clearly signal that
subgroup analyses are generally considered to enjoy significantly less
credibility than ATE results, are ranked lower in terms of quality
of evidence, and are explicitly bracketed from overall effectiveness
evaluations in systematic reviews. What is more, most methodological
recommendations focus on highlighting potential problems with
subgroup analyses, but remain entirely silent on the importance of
subgroup evidence for welfare analysis.11
In addition, alternative methods for detecting and attributing
heterogeneity such as machine learning methods that promise efficient
and unbiased detection of heterogeneity from large-N observational
data (e.g. Athey and Imbens 2016, 2017) are rarely acknowledged or
mentioned in standard methodological guidelines. Even if they were,
these methods would not be straightforwardly compatible with the
standard experimental designs involving relatively small samples that
11 The Campbell Collaboration’s Conduct Standards guidebook is an exception at least
insofar as it suggests that it is highly desirable, although not mandatory, for reviews to
‘include explicit descriptions of the effects of the interventions not only on the whole
population but also describe their effects upon specific population subgroups and/or
their ability to reduce inequalities and to promote their use to the community’ (Campbell
Collaboration 2016: 3). At the same time, this suggestion is still at odds with the Campbell
Collaboration’s extensive references to the Cochrane Collaboration Handbook, which
explicitly cautions against the use of subgroup analysis.
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EBP researchers typically employ, nor would they rank highly on the
quality-of-evidence rankings that are circulated in the methodological
literature as they would, again, be considered observational studies and
hence would be considered to provide evidence of distinctively less
quality and credibility than RCTs.
This suggests that the trade-off between the informativeness of
evidence concerning distributive issues and the epistemic values involved
in assessing the quality of evidence is presently settled, at the level of
several widely disseminated bodies of methodological recommendations,
in favour of the usual standards and the epistemic values that they are
supposed to promote. Following these recommendations hence privileges
the production and use of ATE evidence as the kind of evidence that may
ultimately form a credible basis for policy design.
This licenses two conclusions. First, EBP methodology presently
favours the production and use of ATE evidence that is useful for the
pursuit of values that focus on increasing average or aggregate welfare.
Second, EBP methodology presently fails to promote or even discourages
the production of evidence that is necessary for the pursuit of many
values that put emphasis on the distribution of treatment effects. As a
consequence, standard EBP methodology renders the pursuit of many
values on grounds of EBP evidence relatively more difficult or even
outright infeasible.
To be clear, this is not to say that ATE evidence cannot be useful
at all for the pursuit of values that focus on distributive issues. For
instance, a large negative ATE might strongly suggest that a certain
intervention should not be implemented; and this conclusion might be
action-guiding irrespective of the particular values one is interested in
pursuing. Similarly, if one estimates a particularly large and positive
ATE, this may, in some cases, give us reasons to think that an
intervention is at least somewhat unlikely to make any individuals worse
off.
At the same time, even in such favourable cases, the differential
usefulness of ATE evidence for the pursuit of different kinds of values
still persists. Specifically, if one cares only about average effects, then
the only important quantity is the ATE, which is usually well-identified
in RCTs. On the other hand, putting particular emphasis on whether
an intervention has adverse effects on any individuals will typically
require focusing on information other than the ATE, e.g. results obtained
from subgroup analyses or pre-post intervention comparisons of outcome
distributions. Such analyses can generally not yield unbiased estimates
of individual treatment effects, so while one can perform such additional
analyses, they do generally not enjoy the same credibility as the main
ATEs reported in effectiveness evaluations. This still implies that standard
EBP evidence makes the pursuit of values that are sensitive to the
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distribution of treatment effects relatively more difficult, although perhaps
not always infeasible.
This can have various undesirable consequences. To illustrate,
consider the case of two policymakers A and B. Suppose that A is
concerned with increasing average or aggregate outcomes, whereas B
pursues prioritarian values, i.e. she cares specifically about whether
an intervention promotes the outcomes of the pre-intervention worst-
off individuals. If the available evidence on policy effectiveness reports
mostly the ATEs of interventions, then B will be in a worse position than
A to justify her calls for policy action. This is because the information
that she needs to justify these calls is either not available at all, or, if
available, e.g. in the form of subgroup analyses, is considered to be of
less quality than the ATE evidence that A can invoke to justify her calls
for policy action. Facing standard quality-of-evidence rankings, B will
hence find it recognizably more difficult to justify her calls for policy
action, given one and the same evidence-base. For instance, political
opponents may find it easier to question the credibility of the evidence
that B invokes, as standard quality-of-evidence guidelines discount the
credibility of subgroup results, thus making it more difficult for B to
resist such scrutiny. Moreover, scrutiny of subgroup evidence on epistemic
grounds may also allow non-epistemic motivations to creep back into
evidence-based policymaking. For instance, when an opponent challenges
subgroup-evidence on purportedly epistemic grounds she might in fact
do so because she considers the policy that is being justified by appeal
to such evidence undesirable for moral and political reasons (see e.g.
Barnes and Parkhurst 2014; Parkhurst and Abeysinghe 2016 for similar
concerns). Finally, this situation may also incentivize B to shift the values
she will ultimately promote to those for which high-quality evidence is
available, e.g. by putting more emphasis on average effectiveness rather
than effectiveness that is construed in accordance with her prioritarian
values.
This situation suggests that there is presently a trade-off between
several epistemic values central to EBP and the moral and political
values that policymakers are in a position to pursue effectively on
grounds of EBP evidence. More specifically, whenever the pursuit of
moral and political values requires information about the distributive
consequences of policies, standard EBP evidence fails to provide the
required information. Conversely, whenever evidence of the kind required
to inform about distributive consequences of policies is produced or used,
this typically involves sacrificing at least some EBP epistemic values. More
specifically, as argued above, when methods such as subgroup analyses
are used to generate information on treatment effect heterogeneity, this
may come at the expense of sacrificing the unbiasedness and precision
of effect estimates, the methodological rigour in obtaining such estimates,
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as well as the ability to obtain causal conclusions on the basis of such
estimates. Insisting on these values, on the other hand, comes at the
expense of sacrificing the informativeness of EBP research outputs about
the distributive consequences of policy interventions.12
It is important to be clear that this trade-off only obtains if there is a
strong, and perhaps unique relationship of fit between certain methods
such as RCTs and the epistemic values that I take to be underlying EBP
methodology. If that were not the case, then there could be other methods
that manage to promote the same set of epistemic values; potentially
including methods that are more informative about distributive issues.
I am open to this possibility, as it seems that the trade-off outlined here
is, at bottom, not a necessary one, but one that holds contingently upon
specific features of EBP methodology. More specifically, it seems possible
to hold onto at least some EBP epistemic values while using methods that
are more informative about distributive consequences. For instance, one
can be less or more rigorous when conducting subgroup analyses, e.g. by
taking adequate precautions such as pre-specifying subgroup hypotheses
to ameliorate concerns about data mining. Moreover, subgroup analysis
can also yield more precise estimates of subgroup-specific effects if one has
sufficiently large samples. So there is no necessary compromise of some
or even all EBP epistemic values when using such methods.
At the same time, the particular ways in which different methods
do in fact strike a balance between promoting certain epistemic values
and producing informative evidence on the distributive consequences of
interventions is only part of what constitutes the trade-off I am interested
in. Another, and arguably more important part is the way in which the
relationship of fit between epistemic values and methods is conceived
in standard EBP methodological recommendations. In virtue of lexically
prioritizing certain methods and certain kinds of evidence, as is common
in widely disseminated quality-of-evidence ranking schemes, standard
EBP methodological recommendations suggest that there is a strong,
and perhaps unique relationship of fit between methods such as RCTs
and epistemic values such as unbiasedness, precision etc. So what I am
arguing is not that there is a necessary trade-off, but that this trade-
off obtains primarily relative to how the ability of different methods to
12 This point may appear similar to Helen Longino’s, who argues that several traditional
epistemic values are not purely epistemic and ‘that their use in certain contexts of scientific
judgment imports significant socio-political values into those contexts’ (Longino 1996: 54).
In contrast, my point should appeal even to those who insist on the purely epistemic
character of values such as unbiasedness, precision, and the ability to obtain causal
conclusions. Specifically, I do not argue that these values fail to be purely epistemic.
Instead, even if we grant that they are purely epistemic, their pursuit may still have
important ramifications for the extent to which the pursuit of other, moral values is
facilitated or inhibited.
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promote the achievement of key EBP epistemic values is conceived in EBP
methodological recommendations.
With this overview of the trade-off between epistemic and moral
values in place, let me expand on what it implies for value-freedom and
neutrality in EBP respectively.
4.1. Value-freedom
First, if the value-free ideal underlying EBP is understood as saying
that non-epistemic values are generally not and should not be involved
in shaping the conduct and outcomes of EBP research internally, e.g.
by influencing the collection of data as well as the choice between
different methods, estimators, model specifications and so forth, then
the desirability of this ideal is challenged. Without suitable changes to
EBP methodology, pursuing values that depend on the distribution of
treatment effects on grounds of EBP evidence is presently inhibited. If
this situation should be remedied, then this requires changes to EBP
methodology that enable and facilitate the production and use of evidence
on treatment effect heterogeneity. However, and this is the crucial point,
these changes would be effected by moral values, since it is the desired
ability to effectively pursue moral values on grounds of EBP evidence that
motivates the requisite changes to methodology. To the extent that such
changes to methodology are justifiable and justified, this suggests that
value-freedom in EBP is not a desirable ideal, even at key methodological
stages such as issuing widely disseminated recommendations for method
choice, data collection, model specification, estimation and interpretation.
It is important to emphasize that this may be a transient state
of affairs only, because as soon as requisite changes to standard
methodological recommendations are implemented, and the evidence
that is produced in accordance with revised recommendations becomes
more informative about distributive consequences of policy interventions,
then this may obviate further changes to methodology that are driven
by non-epistemic, moral values. So value freedom in EBP may only be
transiently undesirable. This helps to push back against the concern that
the changes to EBP methodology suggested above are just the first step in
permitting arbitrary influences of moral values on the internal stages of
EBP research.
To further push back on such concerns, it is important to emphasize
that not all changes to EBP methodology will promote the goal of
increasing the extent to which EBP evidence is informative for the pursuit
of widely shared moral and political values such as equality and priority
for the worst off. This goal is sufficiently specific to rule out changes to
EBP methodology that are motivated by other, potentially idiosyncratic
values, e.g. researchers’ personal convictions about the desirability of
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policy interventions, or profit-maximization motives by trial sponsors
who prefer methods that are more likely to produce effect estimates that
are in accordance with their financial interests. Such value-influences
would not be compatible with the kinds of changes to EBP methodology
that facilitate the pursuit of a broader set of moral and political values
on grounds of EBP evidence. So value-freedom in EBP may still remain
an important ideal, but there are reasons to think that it is presently
undesirable, as the pursuit of an important class of values on grounds
of EBP evidence is inhibited until EBP methodological tenets undergo
suitable revisions.
The role for values outlined here hence differs, and extends
considerably beyond extant contributions such as Heather Douglas’s
(2009), who argues that moral values play important and ineliminable
roles in handling the uncertainties that are involved in using evidence for
policy purposes; and that such values may play legitimate indirect roles
in the assessment and use of uncertain evidence. The arguments provided
here suggest that there are cases where the role of non-epistemic moral
values may be even more extensive than previously considered as they
may also, legitimately, play direct roles in governing the production of
evidence, e.g. when a particular moral value figures as a reason in itself
(cf. Douglas 2009: 96) to recommend a particular method over another, or
to use a method in a certain way that helps promote the pursuit of the
moral value in question, even if this proceeds on pain of sacrificing other,
epistemic values.
Two important qualifications need to be added here. First, it is
clear that there can be cases in which policymakers can offer precise
characterizations of the questions they are interested in answering, and
with a view towards the particular values that they are interested in
pursuing. In these cases, when the questions to be addressed are fixed,
it seems that even if values were involved in shaping the questions that
are pursued by EBP researchers, they would not meddle with the outputs
of that research. This seems a clear-cut case where values play only an
external role.13
My concerns apply to a different type of case, however: cases where
evidence is used ‘off the shelf’. This relates to an important goal of EBP,
i.e. to build libraries of evidence that policymakers and practitioners
can consult when addressing certain types of policy problems, or
implementing certain kinds of interventions. In these cases, evidence
is produced before the aims of the particular use-case are determined,
including any values that are to be pursued. Here, it seems that
non-epistemic values may play direct, and legitimate roles at internal
stages. They can act as reasons in themselves, explicitly mentioned
13 I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for raising this important concern.
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in methodological recommendations, and on par with other, epistemic
values, for choosing certain methods over others, even if this comes at
an epistemic price, e.g. less precise estimates, or increases in the risk of
bias.
Of course, this does not mean that any sort of wishful thinking is
going on, as for instance when certain methods are chosen on the grounds
that they are more likely to produce particular kinds of answers. But that
is precisely how my case departs from Douglas’s concern about wishful
thinking cases, i.e. cases where values systematically and illegitimately
meddle with our research results. In contrast, in the present case it
seems that even though values play a direct role at internal stages,
such as method choice and model specification, this is not necessarily
illegitimate. The reason is that the choice of method may have important
non-epistemic ramifications concerning the kinds of policies that are likely
to be implemented on grounds of EBP evidence, and these ramifications
may, legitimately, be anticipated when governing the production of
evidence.
This points to a second important qualification, which is that
I am not suggesting that moral values need to act as reasons in
themselves at internal stages of particular studies. My concerns are
rather with the methodological recommendations that are circulated
in EBP, and that shape the conduct of individual studies. Hence, we
might say that value-freedom in EBP is transiently undesirable, not at
the level of individual studies, but rather at the methodological level
of issuing recommendations for the production and use of different
kinds of evidence. In analogy to study-level internal roles for values in
determining what method to use, which model specification to use, how
to collect data, and how to interpret results, I am concerned with internal
roles for values at the level of general methodological recommendations
pertaining to these issues. Hence, my claim is that value freedom is,
at least transiently, undesirable at the level of widely disseminated
methodological recommendations, although perhaps not at the level of
individual studies.
Let me expand on related concerns about value-neutrality in EBP.
4.2. Value-neutrality
Recall that for the purposes of this paper I understand value-neutrality
in EBP as the idea that EBP research outputs should not be premised
on substantive moral value judgements about the desirability of social
outcomes or the interventions that bring about these outcomes. So in
disseminating the results of policy evaluations EBP researchers may issue
at most conditionally normative recommendations, i.e. recommendations
that are conditional on substantive value judgements but do not endorse
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these judgements as such. For instance, when a policy is considered most
(cost-) effective because it best promotes an outcome such as household
endowment of the rural poor, nutritional health in children etc. it may
be explicitly recommended on grounds of its effectiveness. However,
whether or not the outcomes that the intervention best promotes are in
fact morally desirable should be settled independently, and EBP policy
recommendations should remain neutral with respect to such questions.
This issue is for policymakers and other suitably legitimized agents to
settle.
As the previous discussion suggests, this type of value-neutrality
is undermined by how the trade-off between the informativeness
of evidence and central EBP epistemic values is settled in practice.
More specifically, adherence to widely disseminated methodological
recommendations and the epistemic values underlying them means
that inferences about policy effectiveness remain limited to average
effectiveness assessments and hence do not encompass information about
the distributive consequences of interventions. So the standard way of
operationalizing what it means for a programme to be effective brackets
concerns about distributive issues (see Biller-Andorno et al. 2002 for
similar concerns about evidence-based medicine). As it stands, an effective
programme is considered a good programme to the extent that the
outcome of interest tracks a relevant moral or societal good. However,
even if this good is uncontroversial in itself, effectiveness as standardly
construed in EBP still only means effectiveness on average, not some
effectiveness for everyone, or sufficient effectiveness for the worst-off,
or equal effectiveness for all policy subjects. It is clear that effectiveness
in one sense does not imply effectiveness in others, so policies that
are effective on average can have distributive consequences that are
undesirable relative to a wide variety of values, and hence would not be
considered effective relative to these values.
To achieve value-neutrality in the envisioned sense it is hence not
enough to ensure that the desirability of the outcomes of interest as such
has been settled, or can be settled independently. It is also necessary
to maintain neutrality with respect to the ways in which these outcomes
may be realized. A given change in aggregate outcomes can usually be
achieved in various ways, each of which may have dramatically different
distributive consequences for target populations, and some of these
may be intrinsically more or less desirable than others. If policymakers
who wish to use EBP evidence care about differences between agents,
and about absolute and relative changes in outcome distributions, then
effectiveness as standardly construed in EBP is not informative about the
moral permissibility or desirability of the policies under scrutiny and
might be misleading about what effective programmes are ultimately
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able to achieve, relative to the specific moral and political values that
policymakers pursue.
So, at least presently, it seems that the dissemination of EBP research
is premised on the implicit presupposition that the relevant magnitude for
deciding which policy to implement, is effectiveness in terms of average
effects. This fails to be value-neutral in the envisioned sense because
it presupposes that average effectiveness is the magnitude of interest to
policymakers, rather than delegating the question of whether it is to
policymakers and other suitably legitimized agents to settle. In a nutshell,
in order to maintain a traditional ideal of value-neutrality, additional
value presuppositions such as the above must at least be made explicit for
EBP policy recommendations to remain value-neutral in the envisioned
sense.
Let me close with some general remarks on the role of non-epistemic
values in EBP going forward.
4.3. EBP and Values – Where Next?
The previous discussion raises important questions about what role non-
epistemic moral and political values should play in EBP, and consequently
how potential tradeoffs between epistemic and non-epistemic values
should be settled at the level of widely circulated methodological
recommendations. Should EBP proponents give up on their commitment
to central EBP epistemic values, and if so, which epistemic values? Or
should they bite the bullet and concede that standard EBP evidence fails
to be informative for the pursuit of a wide range of moral and political
values?
It seems unclear whether there is a single, univocal answer to how
this trade-off should be settled. It seems plausible to think that the
precise nature of this trade-off will depend on concrete contextual details
pertaining to the kinds of questions that users of evidence seek to address,
the nature of the policy settings that these questions pertain to, and the
nature of the methods that are available for addressing these questions;
specifically their relative ability to provide certain kinds of information
and the extent to which they promote certain kinds of epistemic values.
These aspects can vary importantly between cases.
What I want to offer here is hence not a set of definitive answers,
but rather some general suggestions for moving forward. Some obvious
suggestions include that the problems outlined above should be explicitly
recognized in EBP methodological guidelines, including an explicit
discussion of the differential usefulness of evidence for the pursuit
of different purposes and values, as well as recognition of the fact
that evidence concerning heterogeneous treatment effects is crucially
important for the pursuit of a wide range of values and purposes. With
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the importance of such evidence more clearly emphasized, it would also
seem desirable if more efforts were exerted in the way of offering up
to date advice on recently proposed methods such as machine learning
approaches for detecting heterogeneity (e.g. Athey and Imbens 2016,
2017) including recommendations for how these methods should be
used, and how the evidence supplied by them can be integrated to
yield more comprehensive assessments of the distributive consequences
of policy interventions. Moreover, it seems sensible to suggest that
EBP methodological recommendations should offer explicit guidelines
for how authors of primary EBP research and meta-analyses should
comment on potential limitations of their research. For instance, one may
recommend that authors expand more explicitly on the deliberations
underlying their choice of specific methods, including, if applicable,
a commentary on why they chose not to use certain methods and
how and why they may have chosen to sacrifice informativeness of
the evidence in the pursuit of adherence to certain epistemic values.
This is similar to what Heather Douglas (2009) and many others (e.g.
Elliott 2017) have been calling for, i.e. more transparency on the part
of researchers about choices that may invariably involve non-epistemic
considerations.
My second, and more general suggestion is that a general framework
is needed to help facilitate deliberation about the role of values in EBP,
i.e. a framework that can help structure and elucidate different ways
in which epistemic and non-epistemic values may play a role in EBP
methodological recommendations going forward.
In standard EBP methodological recommendations, the production
of different kinds of evidence is presently recommended on epistemic
grounds, i.e. evidence-ranking schemes rank different types of evidence
according to their ability to promote standard EBP epistemic values. As
the previous discussion makes clear, however, even evidence that ticks
all the boxes on the epistemic desiderata underlying such rankings will
neither necessarily, nor typically, be useful for the pursuit of all important
purposes. This suggests that there is not only an epistemic dimension to
recommending the production and use of certain kinds of evidence, but
also a non-epistemic dimension concerning what kinds of evidence are
useful for the pursuit of different values and purposes.
Recognizing the importance of both dimensions suggests that it
may be useful to adopt a framework that integrates both epistemic
and non-epistemic considerations relevant for governing the production
and use of evidence for EBP. This is not an entirely new idea, of
course. There have been several proposals in the philosophy of science
literature to apply so-called coupled epistemic-ethical frameworks (e.g. Tuana
2013) to various policy-relevant activities in the special sciences, e.g. in
climate science (Tuana et al. 2012) and evidence-based medicine (e.g.
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Katikireddi and Valles 2015). While I am not suggesting that these
frameworks can be straightforwardly applied to the present case, it
seems that integrating epistemic and ethical concerns might be useful
for investigating, structuring and eventually settling the above tensions
between epistemic and non-epistemic values in EBP.
There are various ways in which this can be fleshed out in more
detail. For instance, one way could be to say that in addition to
ranking evidence according to its quality on epistemic grounds, there
should be complementary attempts to rank different kinds of evidence
according to their ability to individually, or jointly with other kinds of
evidence, provide comprehensive accounts of policy effects, including
details on adverse effects on subgroups as well as changes in the outcome
distributions brought about by policy interventions.
These two dimensions together may allow us to systematically
explore the particular balance that different kinds of evidence, and
different combinations of such evidence, strike concerning the extent to
which they promote epistemic and non-epistemic desiderata respectively.
Some methods might do well on epistemic desiderata but may
be extremely limited in their scope of sensible application; other
methods might strike a more even balance. Analysing such trade-offs
systematically, across a range of different methods and different types
of policy scenarios, may help us get a better grasp of the joint epistemic
and non-epistemic consequences of issuing preferences for certain kinds
of methods over others. Finally, a joint epistemic-ethical analysis may
also help us to distinguish between different kinds of trade-offs that vary
in severity as well as cases where trade-offs may perhaps not obtain
at all.
Naturally, considering both epistemic and non-epistemic dimensions
in recommending the production of particular kinds of evidence will
raise the important question of how these dimensions should be weighed
against each other. Any particular weighting of these dimensions will
reflect some way in which a trade-off between epistemic and non-
epistemic, moral values is settled. As I have suggested above, my aim
is not to recommend specific weightings, but merely to highlight that
it seems important to develop a framework that facilitates deliberation
about such weightings by making choices pertaining to them explicit. So
similar to other calls in the values in science literature to make the role of
non-epistemic, moral values as explicit as possible, my suggestion here is
that adopting an epistemic-ethical approach can mark an important first
step in facilitating joint deliberation among methodologists, researchers,
users of EBP evidence and relevant stakeholders about how trade-
offs between quality of evidence on epistemic grounds and the
usefulness of evidence for the pursuit of different values should be
settled.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that there is a trade-off between several key EBP epistemic
values and non-epistemic, moral and political values that are sensitive
to distributive consequences of policies, e.g. equality and priority for the
worst-off. This trade-off obtains because the outputs afforded by standard
EBP methods are differentially useful for the pursuit of different moral
and political values. I have argued that this trade-off challenges, at least
transiently, ideals of value-freedom and neutrality in EBP. This may be
taken as a starting point to reconsider, in an epistemic-ethical framework,
some of the standard epistemic value presuppositions entertained in EBP.
Doing so, I hope, can help refine EBP methodological recommendations
in ways that enable and facilitate the production of evidence that is useful
for pursuing a wider range of important moral and political values.
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